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The Case for Parallel Importation
Jamie S. Gorelick* and Rory K. Little**
I. Introduction
Parallel importers' provide domestic consumers with foreign-
made trademarked goods at prices below those set by the multina-
tional owners of the trademark. Their goods are by definition the
genuine trademarked article-not counterfeit or adulterated goods.
The practice of buying such genuine goods overseas, importing
them into the United States, and selling them at bargain prices-par-
allel importation-has existed for years. As President Reagan stated
when he rejected an International Trade Commission vote to impose
an exclusion on parallel imports, such a policy would be "at odds
with the longstanding regulatory interpretation of the Department of
the Treasury."'2
Despite Customs regulations that sanction parallel imports,3 pri-
vate legal actions against parallel importers persist. Unable to per-
suade Congress or the Executive Branch to change the law, domestic
affiliates of multinational corporations intent upon maintaining artifi-
cially high prices in the United States have sought relief in federal
* Member of the firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C. J.D.
1975, Harvard University.
** Member of the firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C. J.D.
1982, Yale University.
I The term "parallel importers" is a shorthand term used to encompass all parties
involved in the chain of commerce ultimately resulting in the domestic sale of genuine
imported trademarked goods by independent companies. The term includes buyers, im-
porters, wholesalers and retailers of such goods, when the goods have not been obtained
directly from "authorized" United States dealers. The purchase, importation and sale of
such goods is said to be "parallel" to the channels "authorized" by the international trade-
mark owners. See infra text at note 5.
2 Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, 831, disapproved by President
Reagan pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982), 50 Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 862, appeal dismissed sub noma. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778
F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Presidential determination was consistent with the Ad-
ministration's general view that "[a] principal foreign policy objective of the United States
is to protect and expand free trade." United Press International, Press Release (Oct. 8,
1985) reporting the welcoming address of President Ronald W. Reagan for Singapore's
Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew.
3 The Customs Service has enforced regulations that permit parallel importation
since 1936. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. The regulations are currently
codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1985).
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courts. In response, defenders of parallel importation seek to pre-
serve this low-cost option for the U.S. consumer.
Despite the innumerable factual distinctions that underlie any
class of litigation, there are common legal and factual defenses to
parallel importation. First, the factual context that gives rise to the
problem reveals the strong policy reasons for the longstanding regu-
lations that permit parallel importation. Second, the historical con-
text of legislation that addresses parallel importation demonstrates
congressional and judicial interest in protecting only independent
domestic purchasers of foreign trademarks, not multinational con-
glomerates. Third, administrative practice over the past half-century
shows that importation of genuine trademarked goods has never been
prohibited unless the U.S. trademark owner is independent of for-
eign control. Fourth, legislative actions over the past forty years in-
dicate that Congress has examined and ratified the legal
interpretation that permits parallel importation. Finally, other coun-
tries-our trading partners-allow and encourage parallel importa-
tion, and the practice serves competitive goals. After examination of
these factors, the case for parallel importation is strong, and the
counterarguments unpersuasive.
II. The Factual Context
To secure higher U.S. prices, foreign manufacturers often estab-
lish or utilize U.S. corporations, closely affiliated with or controlled
by the foreign company, as the exclusive, "authorized" domestic dis-
tributor of the trademarked goods. These subsidiaries or affiliates
use the same trade name already popularized by the foreign parent
in markets worldwide. By assigning the U.S. trademark rights to
their domestic affiliates, the multinational companies create a "domi-
ciliary" corporation to act as the technical "owner" of the U.S. trade-
mark rights. Still heavily influenced by the foreign manufacturers,
these companies then attempt to restrict competitive imports by as-
serting rights they claim belong only to the "authorized" U.S. dis-
tributors of the foreign product.
Independent domestic companies have recognized the opportu-
nity provided by international price differentials in trademarked
goods. Such companies purchase the genuine trademarked goods in
foreign markets-at whatever the going price set by the manufac-
turei may be-and openly bring them into the United States, paying
all legitimate duties and costs. 4 These authentic trademarked goods
are then sold to the public at low prices-as much as forty percent
less than the "authorized" distributor's price-that accurately reflect
4 Again, this is a shorthand description. A domestic retailer of parallel imports may
not be the same entity that buys the products overseas or that imports them into the
United States. See supra note 1.
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their value in international markets. This "parallel" importation and
distribution-parallel to the multinational companies' "authorized"
U.S. channels-provides an alternate source of trademarked goods
for the U.S. consumer. 5
The plaintiff in a parallel importation action is invariably the
"authorized" domestic distributor of trademarked goods that are
made and sold overseas. 6 The variety of corporate relationships be-
tween these domestic companies and their foreign affiliates are myr-
iad. The foreign parent/domestic subsidiary relationship seems to
be most common, but the permutations are limited only by a corpo-
rate lawyer's imagination. One common fact that cannot be hidden
by any corporate veil, however, is the domestic plaintiff's power to
control the foreign price and distribution of the product.
This last point is central and should be the focus of discovery
and stressed to any court unfamiliar (as most naturally are) with par-
allel importation. Parallel importers only buy goods at prices that
foreign manufacturers are willing to sell the goods. Original trade-
mark owners are not forced to sell in foreign markets at prices that
encourage parallel importation. Similarly, no one compels foreign
distributors to sell to parallel importers at all, or to sell at exceed-
ingly low prices and in exceedingly large quantities in markets, such
as Hong Kong, that are well understood to be sources of parallel
import goods.
Finally, nothing but the manufacturer's free choice places identi-
cally trademarked goods in different geographic markets. If multina-
tional trademark holders truly want to maintain geographically
distinct markets, they can use distinct labels for goods distributed in
different countries, so that consumer recognition would be interna-
tionally nontransferable. 7 In short, any "problem" of parallel impor-
tation is entirely self-inflicted. Not unlike civil contemnors,
multinational trademark holders hold the key to their own release.8
5 Opponents like to refer to this system as the "grey market," with its innuendo of
impropriety or borderline legality. There is, however, nothing underhanded about the
business practice at issue. The goods are the authentic trademarked item, purchased
openly on the open market. The goods are declared, customs duties are paid, and the
products are sold in the United States by reputable, well-established domestic retailers.
6 See, e.g. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986) (stating that "Viv-
itar has little or no manufacturing facilities of its own, but rather has its products manufac-
tured to specification by various foreign manufacturers, principally in Japan"). In rare
cases, the plaintiff is a U.S. company which, in addition to manufacturing some of its goods
in this country, also licenses the manufacture and distribution of its goods overseas at
varying prices.
7 In the United States, we are dimly aware of existing examples of such strategy. For
example, the Volkswagon "Rabbit" model was for years known in Europe as the "Golf."
More recently, Minolta has begun to market a U.S. camera called the "Maxxum." Unfamil-
iarity with other examples merely demonstrates the effectiveness of the strategy.
8 Rather than bear the cost of such measures, opponents of parallel importation
have suggested that parallel importers should have to "demark" the goods they sell, by
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Why, then, do U.S. owners of international trademarks retreat to
the courts for relief? The answer would seem to be at least fourfold.
First, and most significantly, the executive and legislative branches
have refused to provide price supports. Both the House and Senate
committees have noted the legality of parallel importation and re-
jected efforts to alter the laws that permit parallel importation. 9 Sim-
ilarly, the President has refused to block parallel importation as
contrary to long-standing executive policy.' 0
Second, trademark owners seem to prefer litigation to self-help
solutions that would require them to restructure their current mar-
keting strategies. Using different marks or labels in different mar-
kets, for example, requires the domestic affiliates to forego the
international identity of their product." By contrast, litigation, if
successful, would allow international corporations to control the
flow and price of their products in the United States without giving
up their international control or high profits.
Third, economic explanation has been offered by Calvin J. Col-
lier, former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. 12 Collier
notes that, as good businessmen, foreign manufacturers presumably
profit on each sale of their product, no matter where the sale is
made. A multinational corporation may well be indifferent as be-
tween sales in Hong Kong and sales in the United States. Mean-
while, some consumers will pay only so much for a particular product
while others are willing to pay a higher premium. By providing a
lower domestic price for genuine "prestige" trademarked items, par-
allel importation permits foreign manufacturers to maintain a two-
tiered pricing system, satisfying the "snob appeal" of one group of
removing or obscuring the bona fide trademarks. This proposed "solution" has been
soundly debunked, however, as inequitable, confusing, and dangerous to consumers, and
contrary to principles of free trade that normally operate in our legal system. See Lewin,
The Ten Commandments of Parallel Importation, 18 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus...., - (1986).
(The page numbers for this citation were unavailable at the time this article was published.
The article cited will be published in volume 18, Issue I of LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus..)
9 See S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 621, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977); infra notes 64, 66 and accompanying text (discussion of legisla-
tive ratification).
10 Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1578. The International Trade Commission had voted three
to two to find parallel importers of Duracell batteries in violation of the law. The Presi-
dent reversed this determination pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (g)(2) (1982), which per-
mits him to disapprove ITC determinations "for policy reasons." The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit subsequently rejected, on jurisdictional grounds as well as on the
merits, Duracell's attempt to obtain judicial review of the President's action. Duracell, 778
F.2d at 1578.
I This reluctance is particularly telling in light of the "authorized" distributors' ar-
guments that they have established a separate U.S. identity for their foreign trademarks,
deserving of separate trademark protection. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
12 C. Collier, Remarks at the Second Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of International Trade (Oct. 23, 1985) (copy on file at the offices of the North Caro-
lina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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consumers while simultaneously reaching bargain hunters who
otherwise would not buy at all.
Although U.S. trademark owners have consistently opposed dis-
covery regarding their international corporate connections, interna-
tional trademark holders possibly find parallel importation
perversely profitable; thus, there is little incentive to act indepen-
dently to end the practice. The only improvement from this point of
view might be a change in the law to permit exclusive price discrimi-
nation in the United States.
Finally, the statutory base for a lawsuit to prevent parallel impor-
tation is not frivolous at first glance.' 3 Two statutes are invoked by
plaintiffs in recent parallel importation lawsuits. The first, section
526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, is broadly written and seems to be
directly on point. Section 526 provides:' 4
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture if merchandise, on the label, sign, print,
package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citi-
zen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within, the United States, and registered in the Patent & Trademark
Office by a person domiciled in the United States, . . . and if a copy
of the certificate is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, . . . un-
less written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at
the time of making entry. 15
Without examining the historical and interpretive context of this
provision, a U.S. company holding domestic rights to an interna-
tional trademark might understandably consider litigation an easy
solution. Section 526 appears to require only two conditions prece-
dent: corporate organization "within the United States" and regis-
tration by a person "domiciled in the United States." Congress,
however, was merely describing independent domestic corporations
in a simpler age. Congress did not intend to protect foreign agen-
cies, no matter what their corporate form. 16
The second statute relied upon, section 42 of the Lanham Act,' 7
seems equally far off point at first reading. Section 42 forbids the use
of trademarks that "copy or simulate" registered marks owned by
others. Because parallel imports bear the genuine marks applied by
the manufacturer, this language would not seem relevant to parallel
importation suits. Although congressional intent appears to support
this conclusion, a few courts have held otherwise.' 8 The vast major-
13 The legal attack on parallel importation has been based entirely on statutory
grounds. It is otherwise conceded that the honest sale of accurately-marked goods violates
no common law or basic human rights.
14 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982) (citations omitted). Section 526 has not been amended
in relevant part since it was enacted in 1922.
15 Id.
16 See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
18 See infra notes 93-100.
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ity, however, have been largely unsuccessful.19
III. Section 526: History, Enforcement and Ratification
"The decisions of [the Supreme] Court have repeatedly warned
against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which
confines itself to the bare words of a statute, for 'literalness may
strangle meaning.' "20 Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 was en-
acted in a unique legislative and legal context. From the beginning,
Congress intended to limit the scope of this provision to a specific
inequity which was the subject of notorious litigation. Over a half
century of administrative, judicial, and legislative activity in this area
has affirmed this original intent.
A. The Historical Context
Section 526 was enacted in reaction to an ongoing lawsuit
against a parallel importer. Analysis of that case and of the congres-
sional debate on the provision reveals the equitable, fact-specific
moorings of the law.
1. The Katzel Litigation
There is no quarrel as to what prompted Congress to enact sec-
tion 526. The statute was principally a response to the judicial deci-
sion in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.2 1 While Katzel was on appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Senate quickly introduced
and approved section 526. The Supreme Court ultimately decided
the case in a three-paragraph opinion by Justice Holmes. As Judge
Learned Hand later remarked, "had the Supreme Court reversed
that decision [Katzel] last spring, it [section 526] would not have been
enacted at all. ' 2 2
Katzel concerned the right to market in the United States face
1) In four separate attacks on the federal regulations that permit parallel importation,
district courts have granted summary judgment in favor of parallel importation. See Olym-
pus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.
1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States,
598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Vivilar, 585 F. Supp.
at 1415; Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Cust. Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla.
1983). In two private actions not directly implicating the validity of the regulations, judg-
ment was granted against the parallel importers. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618
F. Supp. 700 (D.NJ. 1985); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). A motion for reconsideration is pending in [eil; Osawa was settled before an ap-
peal was perfected.
20 Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) (quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter,
328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946)). The legal standards governing statutory construction are further
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 73-75, 78-89.
21 274 F. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), rev'd, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923).
22 Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F.2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd sub nora. Le
Blume Import Co. v. Coty, Inc., 293 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1923).
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powder bearing a trademark "JAVA," which initially had been regis-
tered in the United States by the French manufacturer. The French
manufacturer then sold the plaintiff their U.S. business, including
the manufacturer's trademarks that were registered in the U.S. Pat-
ent Office.23 The U.S. purchaser re-registered the trademarks and
continued to sell the imported powder as its own to domestic
consumers.
By the time the U.S. purchaser filed suit against a parallel im-
porter seven years later, the purchaser had developed its own iden-
tity with domestic consumers, an identity distinct from the foreign
manufacturer. The U.S. purchaser had expended its own funds,
without subsidies, rebates, or discounts from a foreign parent, to de-
velop the product it had purchased. The judicial opinions suggest
that Bourjois purchased the powder in bulk and repackaged it, "select-
ing colors suitable for the American market, ' ' 24 before applying the
labels bearing the trademark and selling the powder to the U.S. pub-
lic. The plaintiff emphasized that U.S. consumers associated it alone
with the product.25
Based on these representations, Justice Holmes concluded as a
matter of fact that Bourjois' trademark "labels [had] come to be un-
derstood by the public here [in America] as meaning goods coming
from the plaintiff," not the foreign manufacturer.2 6 Nevertheless, the
court of appeals held in Katzel that the domestic trademark owner
could not enjoin a retailer who sold the powder in the United States
under the same mark after purchasing it in France from the authentic
23 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 690.
24 Id. at 691.
25 In its brief to the Supreme Court, Bourjois & Co. stressed that:
The plaintiff's goods, due to the expenditure of a great deal of money for
advertising during the last eight years-(the Court will take judicial notice
that these particular years are probably the equivalent of a half century of
ordinary untroubled years)-are widely and universally recognized through-
out the whole of the United States as the output of this plaintiff and this
recognition extends to the remotest quarters and sections of the country.
Wherever and whenever a box of face powder appears upon the market in
the United States like or similar to the plaintiff's standard package, it is, in
the language of plaintiff's affiant O'Connell, "the indication and proof that
the contents emanates from the New York Company and represents the se-
lection, special treatments, packing and get-up of the New York Company."
Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Katzel. The domestic company summed up its argument as
follows:
The plaintiff having, as explained, acquired its rights by purchase in 1913 at a
very high figure and having then fortified and established those rights and
having identified them with the plaintiff in the public mind by the expendi-
ture of vast sums for advertising, etc., and the payment of enormous taxes, all
representing the investment of U.S. dollars in a U.S. business, has undoubt-
edly become and now is entitled to protection against any invasion of the
trade which it has built up and established, no matter what form that invasion
may take or how plausible or specious the tendered justification for any such
invasion may be.
Id. at 13.
26 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
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manufacturer. 2 7 Because the defendant's French labels accurately
identified the manufacturer of the face powder, the Second Circuit
held that no trademark right had been violated.2 8
Before the Supreme Court could decide Katzel, Congress en-
acted section 526 of the 1922 Tariff Act to overrule the Court of
Appeals' judgment. Without reference to Congress' action, the
Supreme Court arrived at the same result less than three months
later. The Court did not refer to precedent or to the language of any
statutes; it emphasized the equities. On the particular facts of Kat-
zel-facts generally not present in current parallel import litigation-
the Court held that existing law gave the independent domestic
owner of a registered trademark the right to enjoin anyone, includ-
ing the French producer of the goods who had transferred com-
pletely its U.S. rights, from selling the same powder under that mark
in the United States. It would be unfair, noted Justice Holmes, to
permit the French seller to market its goods in the United States by
someone other than the domestic trademark buyer "for the purpose
of evading the effect of the transfer." 29 Such a "contrivance," he
declared, "must fail."'30 For the same equitable reason, Justice
Holmes said, buyers from the French producer, even if not engaged
in any conspiracy, were prohibited from violating the trademark
rights that had been purchased by a domestic concern and that had
been developed independently in this country with the investment of
$400,000.31
Although its implications may have been broad, Justice Holmes
quickly gave the Katzel holding a narrow interpretation. In the next
term, the Court again addressed a claim against a parallel importer,
this time by the owners of trademarked "toilet powders and per-
27 Katzel, 275 F. at 543.
28 Id.
29 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
30 Id.
31 Katzel, 274 F. at 857. Shortly after Katzel was decided, the Supreme Court ruled in
a one-sentence per curiam opinion that the same plaintiff could prevent, under section 27 of
the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, the importation by a third party of face powders made in
France by the same company from which the plaintiff obtained its powder. A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923). The petitioner's brief in the Aldidge case makes
clear that the facts were virtually identical to those in Katzel. Brief for Petitioner at 1, 3-6,
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923). The defendant, Aldridge, was the
Customs Collector for the Port of New York. Responding to the petition in Aldridge, the
Solicitor General asserted no opposition to the relief requested by the U.S. Bourjois Com-
pany-the Court's per curiam opinion ruled that the plaintiff should have the relief it re-
quested, the defendant not objecting. Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 676. It was surely relevant to
this decision that, in the interim, Congress had enacted section 526, which the Solicitor
General quoted in his memorandum. Thus, the Aldridge decision, which was tied com-
pletely to the facts and analysis of Katzel, held only that an independent U.S. trademark
owner that had developed its own public identity and good will with the trademarked
product could have foreign-made trademarked goods excluded. Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 675.
It thus adds nothing to the holding of Katzel itself.
[VOL. I I
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fumes." '3 2 The importer concededly did not "adulterat[e] or other-
wise deteriorat[e] the plaintiff's product," and "handled the . . .
product without in any way injuring its qualities." 33 The Court re-
versed an "absolute injunction" against the defendant. Justice
Holmes wrote:
A trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to
protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product
as his. There is nothing to the contrary in [Katzefl. There the trade-
mark protected indicated that the goods come from the plaintiff in
the United States, although not made by it, and therefore could not
be put upon other goods of the same make coming from abroad.
When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public, we
see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell
the truth. It is not taboo.
34
To date, no domestic trademark-holding company has proven that
marks such as Cartier, Minolta or Oscar de la Renta "indicate that
the goods come from" the U.S. mark holder. Indeed, such marks'
foreign images enable their owners to sell at a premium in the
United States.
There can be no doubt that the Katzel litigation concerned equi-
ties very different from those present in modern-day parallel impor-
tation litigation. The Katzel courts addressed the rights of an
independent domestic trademark owner that had invested substantial
amounts of its own money in purchasing a trademark from a foreign
manufacturer and then in developing a domestic identity distinct from
that of the foreign trademark owner. The central question was
whether the foreign manufacturer's goods, not subject to any control
or influence by the domestic trademark owner, could freely compete
in the United States against the same now-independent mark, merely
because they were "authentic" products.
An entirely different situation is presented when the owners of
the U.S. and foreign trademark are corporate affiliates or parent and
subsidiary-essentially the same corporate being. Only in these situ-
ations do the Customs Service regulations permit parallel importa-
tion to occur,3 5 which ensures that most modern-day litigation
involves facts distinct from Katzel. In such circumstances, the domes-
tic and foreign trademark owners, acting jointly, seek protection
against price competition from their own merchandise, which they
have chosen to send into the stream of international commerce at
varying prices.
Such multinational corporations, including their domestic trade-
mark holders, have alternative means readily available to prevent
32 Prestonettes Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
'13 Id. at 367.
.14 Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
35 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1985). The pertinent text of the regulation is quoted
infra note 54.
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their foreign-distributed goods from competing with the goods they
send to the United States. They could (1) sell their products at the
same prices here and abroad, or (2) distinguish the domestic prod-
ucts from the foreign ones-as Bourjois & Co. did-by producing or
packaging them differently, by giving the products different model
names or numbers, or by applying a different mark. However, enlist-
ing the aid of the U.S. government to exclude totally foreign-manu-
factured products, based solely on domestic registration of the
trademark without any showing of independent investment or good
will, goes far beyond any legitimate economic interest the domestic
trademark holder may assert, as well as beyond any limits the Con-
gress or the Supreme Court originally intended.
2. The Legislative History
The 1922 discussion of section 526 on the Senate floor cor-
roborates the primary lesson of the Katzel litigation. Congress was
addressing the same inequity subsequently addressed by the
Supreme Court: fraud on independent domestic businessmen who
had purchased and developed trademark rights independently from
a foreign manufacturer. The emphasis on the rights of independent
domestic companies threatened by inequitable foreign competition
permeated the short congressional debate. Congress was concerned
lest foreign enterprises take unfair advantage of independent domes-
tic firms to which the foreign entrepreneurs had sold exclusive trade-
mark rights in this country for substantial sums, particularly if the
domestic purchasers had thereafter developed independent local
good will. The legislative history of section 526 demonstrates be-
yond cavil, however, that Congress did not intend to provide a
means for market manipulation whereby a foreign conglomerate
could suppress international price competition.
Discussion of the provision was brief, covering less than three
full pages of the Congressional Record. There were no legislative hear-
ings or reports. Moreover, one Senator described the provision as
"one of the midnight amendments" to the tariff bill.36 This relative
brevity did not prevent a full airing of the various positions. The
Senators who opposed the legislation urged that it be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations or the Committee on Patents. Pro-
ponents such as Senator Sutherland of West Virginia, however, fully
explained that the statute's simplicity permitted quick considera-
tion-its "only aim is to prevent a palpable fraud."'3 7 He continued:
I believe that the Senate is in favor of protecting the property rights
36 62 CONG. REC. 11602 (1922). Senator Moses also noted that the section was in-
serted in the bill originally, without hearing, and, after removal by committee, "was put
back in the bill among the myriad amendments brought in by the committee the other
morning after their midnight session." Id.
'37 62 CONG. REC. 11603 (1922) (emphasis added).
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of American citizens who have purchased trade-marks from foreign-
ers and when these foreigners deliberately violate the property
rights of those to whom they have sold these trade-marks by ship-
ping over to this country goods under those identical trade-marks.3
8
Senator McCumber, a co-sponsor of the comprehensive tariff
bill, then explained that he supported the new provision because, in
light of the decision of the court of appeals in Katzel, "the American
purchasers of these [trademark] rights are entirely unprotected." 3 9
The amendment, he said, was "to give the opportunity to protect the
American purchaser."'40 In answer to further questions, he de-
scribed section 526 as "a prohibition against the violation of...
contract," and he added, "[i]n a thousand ways we have guarded
against fraud, and this [is] one among the thousand." 4 '
The focus was on fraud against domestic companies. No one
suggested that a foreign-owned holder of a domestic trademark
should be permitted to monopolize the flow and price of its goods in
the United States. In fact, a final question directed to Senator Mc-
Cumber by Senator Lenroot, an opponent of the legislation, ques-
tioned whether a foreign manufacturer would be able, under section
526, to have a domestic agent register its trademark in the United
States and then bar others from importing the trademarked item.
Senator McCumber flatly rejected that possibility: "The mere fact of
a foreigner having a trade-mark and registering that trade-mark in
the United States, and selling the goods in the United States through
an agency, of course, would not be affected by the provision." 4 2
Careful examination of the 1922 legislative history reveals a
hastily drafted legislative provision designed to prevent an inequity
sanctioned by a recent court decision.4 3 The statute should not be
38 Id.
39 62 CONG. REC. 11604 (1922).
40 Id.
41 Id. A particular illustration of the kind of U.S. investment sought to be protected
was given by Senator Simmons of North Carolina. He described the case of the U.S. own-
ers of the Bayer Aspirin trademark, who had purchased that German interest at an auction
conducted after World War I by the Alien Property Custodian for five million dollars. Id.
The trademark rights were thus completely severed from the foreign owner. Exactly as in
the Katzel case, this transaction obviously had been accomplished at arms-length, and the
importation of German aspirin under the same trademark would have destroyed the value
of that purchase.
42 62 CONG. REC. 11605 (1922).
43 Rather than contest the accuracy of this legislative image, opponents of parallel
importation often merely discount the significance of floor debate. But as Chief Justice
Marshall long ago acknowledged, "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived." United States v. Fisher, 2
Cranch 358, 386 (1805). "Generalities about statutory construction help us little. They
are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience. They do not solve the special diffi-
culties in construing a particular statute. The variables render every problem of statutory
construction unique." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221
(1952) (citations omitted). Thus, while the Supreme Court has sensibly acknowledged that
"the statements of one legislator made during debate may not be controlling," it has gone
on to note that "remarks ...of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an
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given range far afield from this precise context. A broader reading
of section 526, based on its most sweeping literal application, raises
the unanswerable question: why, in 1922, would Congress want to
prevent importation of goods manufactured abroad whose trade-
mark ownership-even if nominally held by an American company-
is truly controlled by a foreign corporation? Courts have a duty to
make an intelligent determination regarding congressional intent,
rather than blindly applying the broadest possible meaning of a stat-
ute. An intelligent litigator must fully present the context of section
526 to the court.
B. The Regulatory Context
The Customs Service (formerly known as the "Bureau of Cus-
toms") is the executive agency charged with the administration of
section 526. After many cases involving discovery from the agency's
files, it seems clear that Customs has never knowingly invoked sec-
tion 526 to bar products that bear a foreign corporation's trade-
marks when the foreign corporation owns or controls the domestic
mark holder. Instead, Customs has consistently applied the law to
prevent foreign control of domestic trademark rights.
Customs initially found, as had Congress, that the dual statutory
requirements of (1) domestic organization and (2) domiciliary suffi-
ciently ensured that section 526's protections would not be abused.
Thus, the first set of Customs regulations, issued in 1923 as Articles
475-480, merely echoed the statutory language and granted protec-
tion for "trade-marks owned by an American citizen." In 1936, a few
years after Congress re-enacted section 526 in the Tariff Act of
1930, 44 the Bureau of Customs issued the first set of regulations,
which delineated exactly how far the statute reached:
[M]erchandise manufactured or sold in a foreign country under a
trade-mark or trade name, which trade-mark is registered and re-
corded, or which trade name is recorded under the trade-mark laws
of the United States, shall not be deemed for the purposes of these
regulations to copy or simulate such United States trade-mark or
trade name, if such lbreign trade-mark or trade name and such United States
trade-mark or trade name are owned by the same person, partnership, associa-
tion, or corporation.
45
The Customs authorities have never wavered from the policy ex-
pressed in the 1936 regulation: foreign-manufactured goods bear-
ing a trademark owned in the foreign country "by the same person
authoritative guide to the statute's construction," especially where such remarks regarding
a floor amendment are "the only authoritative indications of congressional intent." North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982).
44 Ch. 497, Title IV, § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
45 T.D. 48537 (1936) (emphasis added). As its language and cited authority makes
clear, this decision also implemented the "copy or simulate" language of section 27 of the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905. See infra note 98.
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• . .or corporation" that owns the domestic trademark should not
be excluded. The Customs regulations of 1943 and 1947 carried for-
ward this language.4 6 The regulations made it clear that a domestic
trademark owner cannot exclude its own foreign affiliate's genuine
goods bearing the same trademark from the United States. That is
precisely what most parallel import plaintiffs seek in litigation.
Increased transnational commerce has fostered complex inter-
national corporate relationships. Accordingly, the Customs regula-
tions have been adjusted to meet changing conditions while carrying
out basic congressional intent. A 1953 revision of Customs regula-
tions, designed "[t]o eliminate obsolete material, [and] correct dis-
crepancies, ' 4 7  added to the "same person or corporation"
exception 4 8 the phrase "or by a related company as defined in sec-
tion 45 of the Trade-mark Act of 1946."
49
In 1951 Commissioner of Customs, Frank Dow, in a letter to
Senator Paul Douglas explained Customs policy:
As interpreted by the Bureau, section 526 prohibits the importation
of genuine articles of foreign origin bearing a genuine trade-mark
valid in the foreign country, which articles were not produced by or with the
authority of the United States owner of such mark. .... The reason for
such prohibition is that the assignment of a trade-mark is ineffective
without the good will of the business and the foreign trade-mark owner
by the assignment has divested himself of all right to use the mark sofar as the
United States is concerned. However, if the United States trade-mark
owner and the owner of the foreign rights to the same mark are one
and the same person, articles produced and sold abroad by the foreign
owner may be imported by anyone for the reason that the trade-mark owner
has himself introduced the articles into commerce or authorized such introduc-
tion and may not unreasonably restrict the use of the product thereafter. 50
A decade later, on June 27, 1962, the Deputy Commissioner of
Customs wrote to an attorney and summarized the Customs Ser-
vice's policy:
The Bureau does not agree with your contention as to wholly owned
foreign subsidiaries of a United States trademark owner. It is the
Bureau's opinion that a foreign wholly owned subsidiary and its United
States parent corporation are the same corporation within the meaning of
section 11.14(b) of the Customs Regulations. This interpretation has
46 See 8 Fed. Reg. 8296, 8300 (1943) (codifying the regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 11.14
(1944)).
47 T.D. 53399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376 (1953).
48 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49 T.D. 53399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376, 384 (1953). Although the "related company"
language was deleted in 1959, 24 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1959), the change had little substantive
effect on enforcement policy. After 1959, just as prior to 1953, Customs viewed the U.S.
and foreign owners of a trademark as the "same person"-and did not exclude their for-
eign-made goods-if they were parent and subsidiary or under common control. See
Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States Bureau of
Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK REP. 301, 310 (1969).
50 On file at the offices of North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation (emphasis added).
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been consistently applied for some years before insertion of the "related
companies" provision in the customs regulations and since the "re-
lated companies" provision was deleted from the regulations in
1959.51
In 1963, the Deputy Customs Commissioner continued to ex-
press the same view:
It has been the Bureau's position for many years that in permitting
anyone to import merchandise manufactured or sold by the foreign parent or
subsidiary corporation of an American trademark owner is [sic] the correct in-
terpretation of section 526 of the tariff act and section 42 of the trade-
mark law. 5 f
In 1968, the Treasury issued a decision making it explicit that
any type of controlling affiliate relationship was the key to Customs'
enforcement of section 526:
The trademark or trade name on imported foreign-produced mer-
chandise shall not be deemed to copy or simulate a registered trade-
mark or trade name, if the foreign producer is the parent or subsidiary of the
American owner or the firms are under a common control. Further, if a for-
eign producer has been authorized by the American owner to pro-
duce and sell goods abroad bearing the recorded trademark or trade
name, merchandise so produced and sold is deemed admissible.
5 3
Finally, following its consistent course, Customs promulgated,
after due notice and receipt of comments, the 1972 regulations that
remain in force today. 54 There can be no doubt of the accuracy of
the Court of International Trade's conclusion that "Customs' long
standing [sic] construction has been consistently applied since at
least 1962, and . . . probably reflects Customs general practice
under its regulations since 1936." 5 5
51 Letter from B.H. Flinn, Deputy Customs Commissioner, to Walter A. Slowinsk;
(June 27, 1962) (emphasis added).
52 Letter from B.H. Flinn, Deputy Customs Commissioner, to SeligJ. Levitan (Mar.
19, 1963) (emphasis added).
The consistency of these administrative interpretations during the 1950s and 1960s
belies the argument advanced by some opponents of parallel importation that Customs
developed its policy only in response to the Guerlain litigation of the late 1950s. See
United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Lanvin, Parfums, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, vacated and
remanded sub nom. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F.
Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), discussed infra note 117.
53 T.D. 69-12(2), 3 C.B. 17 (1969) (emphasis added).
54 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1985). This regulation permits parallel importation in
three situations-when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by
the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or
control .. . ;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner. Id.
55 Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 432, aff'd, 761 F. 2d at 1568 ("same entity" limitation has
been consistently applied since 1936). Accord COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 852. This conclu-
sion has been reached by the Executive Branch as well. As mentioned above, in 1985 the
President overrode a three to two determination of the International Trade Commission
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A noted Customs authority has explained that even though
some details of Customs' regulatory language has varied over the
years, the agency "always denied complete exclusionary protection
to an American trademark registrant when it knew the importer to be
a subsidiary or parent of the foreign user of the trademark."
5 6
[T]he [Customs Service] is enforcing what it considers to be the
Congressional intent to protect American firms against the fraud of
foreign assignors of trademarks. Clearly if the American registered
mark is owned or controlled by a foreign firm or an American firm
under foreign ownership or control, that intent is not being carried
out. That is why the [Customs Service] does not interpret Section
526 literally whenever a firm "organized" in the United States is in-
volved, but looks to the true controlling force over the trademark.
5 7
The published regulations and the explanatory letters written by
Customs officials, as well as authoritative secondary sources, confirm
the Customs Service's consistent and rational view since at least
1936. In implementing its position over the last half century, the
Customs Service has been carrying out Congress' original purpose,
to protect independent domestic firms-and only such independent
firms-from foreign producers' unfair or fraudulent competitive
tactics.
C. Legislative Ratification
Congress effectively approved Customs' interpretation of sec-
tion 526 in congressional treatment of the subject of parallel impor-
tation on several occasions when related legislation has been
considered. In 1954, 1959, 1978, and 1984, Congress considered
the importation of trademarked goods without suggesting that Cus-
toms should change its policy permitting parallel importation under
some circumstances.
The Supreme Court has applied this principle of legislative rati-
fication in a number of recent cases. In Bob Jones University v. United
States,5 8 the Court upheld Internal Revenue Service rulings denying
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational institutions.
Congress knew of the rulings for more than a decade:
Failure of Congress to modify the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971, of
which Congress was, by its own studies and by public discourse, con-
stantly reminded, and Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-ex-
empt status for racially discriminatory schools when enacting other
and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legisla-
tive acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and
that parallel importation of trademarked alkaline batteries was unlawful, noting that "the
Commission's interpretation . . . is at odds with the longstanding regulatory interpreta-
tion by the Department of the Treasury." 50 Fed. Reg. at 1655.
56 Atwood, supra note 49, at 307.
57 Id. at 305-06.
58 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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1971 rulings.59
Even when an agency's original determination of statutory au-
thority is murky, congressional acquiescence in the agency's regula-
tory practice has been held to constitute congressional approval. In
Haig v. Agee 60 the Court sustained the revocation of a passport by the
Secretary of State, although "[t]he [1926] Passport Act does not in
so many words confer" upon the Secretary "[the] power to revoke a
passport."' 6' The Secretary had officially asserted such a power by
regulation since at least 1956. In 1978, Congress had enacted legis-
lation relating to passports without modifying the State Department
regulations relating to passport revocation. Three years later the
Supreme Court upheld a revocation and noted:
The 1978 amendments are weighty evidence of congressional ap-
proval of the Secretary's interpretation. . . . Despite the long-
standing and officially promulgated view that the Executive had the
power to withhold passports for reasons of national security and for-
eign policy, Congress in 1978, "though it once again enacted legisla-
tion relating to passports, left completely untouched the
[administrative practice]." 6 2
Customs' parallel importation regulations satisfy the ratification
standard applied in Bob Jones, Haig v. Agee and various other Supreme
Court cases. Congress' most recent consideration of questions re-
lated to foreign trademarks occurred during enactment of the Trade-
mark Counterfeiting Act of 1984.63 The Senate Judiciary Committee
announced to all members that the new anti-counterfeit measures
should not be used to hinder parallel imports:
[The bill] does not include within its coverage so-called "grey mar-
ket" goods-i.e., authentic trademarked goods that have been ob-
tained from overseas markets. The importation of such goods is
legal under certain circumstances. For example; the Treasury De-
partment has long interpreted section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
19 U.S.C. 1526, to permit the importation of such goods when the
foreign and domestic users of the trademark are affiliated through
common ownership and control. 64
Six years earlier, in 1978, Congress also examined section 526,
but did not change the administrative practice regarding parallel im-
ports. 6 5 Again, Congress knew of Customs' parallel importation pol-
icy when it acted. The House Report noted that section 526:
has been consistently interpreted by the United States Customs Ser-
vice for the past 20 years as excluding from protection foreign-pro-
59 Id. at 599.
60 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
61 Id. at 290.
62 Id. at 301 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965)).
63 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2179 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1116
(1982)).
64 S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984).
65 See Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
410, 92 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattereds section of 19 U.S.C.).
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duced merchandise bearing a genuine trademark created, owned,
and registered by a citizen of the United States if the foreign pro-
ducer has been authorized by the American trademark owners to
produce and sell abroad goods bearing the recorded trademark. 66
The 1978 Act added subsection (d) to section 526, which established
an exemption to section 526 for trademarked goods brought into
this country for personal use.6 7 Thus, Congress explicitly focused
on the scope of section 526. However, the comprehensive 1978 bill,
which contained twenty-seven separate sections affecting customs
law, "left completely untouched" 6 8 the Customs Service's interpreta-
tion of, and practice under, section 526 regarding foreign-controlled
domestic distributors of foreign-made genuine trademarked goods.
In 1954 and 1959, Congress also refused to modify section 526,
even though it had before it legislative proposals concerning that
specific section. 6 9 Indeed, in December 1953 the Treasury Depart-
ment had issued Treasury Decision 53399, a public, announcement
of Customs' policy. 70 The proposed legislation would have enacted
those policies into positive law. 7 ' Because the Customs Bureau con-
sistently administered the statute to effect those policies, Congress
apparently saw no need for positive legislation. Rather than change
Customs' practice or express dissatisfaction with it, Congress simply
left the law, and the practice, exactly as it had been.
This long record of congressional awareness and repeated ac-
ceptance of Customs' policy more than amply justifies the conclusion
of various district courts that Congress has ratified the Customs Ser-
vice's interpretation. 72 Such a conclusion merely reaffirms the
"venerable principle" acknowledged in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC73 that "the construction of a statute by those charged with its
execution should be followed unless there are compelling indica-
tions that it is wrong, especially where Congress has refused to alter
the administrative construction. ' 7 4 Most parallel importation oppo-
nents ignore the substantial deference required for agency interpre-
tation of law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 75 The
Customs regulations went through all the procedural steps required
66 H.R. REP. No. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977).
67 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (1982).
68 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 12.
69 See H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1959); Customs Simplification Act of 1954:
Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives on H.R. 9476,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1954).
70 T.D. 53399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376 (1953).
71 See H. R. REP. No. 9476, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., ist
Sess. 2, 3. These bills likely were a response to the Guerlain litigation, discussed infra note
117.
72 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 432-33; COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851-52.
73 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
74 Id. at 381.
75 Ch. 423, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06
(1982)); see infra note 83; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
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for agency rule-making. 76 Such agency action properly taken may be
set aside only upon a finding that it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations. ' 77 The rigorous
standards of the APA must be satisfied for litigation to overturn the
regulations embodying Customs' interpretation. Thus, lawyers de-
fending parallel importation actions should not allow these statutory
standards to go unmentioned, let alone unmet.
D. Statutory Construction
Opponents of parallel importation would prefer to ignore all the
evidence demonstrating section 526's narrow scope, as well as the
responsible executive agency's administrative interpretation to that
effect. They argue, instead, that the language of the statute is
"plain" and admits to no limitation, and then invoke the overused
bromide that when "the language . . . is a clear expression of Con-
gressional intent, we need not resort to the legislative history."'78
The Supreme Court has long noted, however, that the "plain
meaning rule" should not be overextended, especially in complex
cases. As the Court noted almost a century ago, when any doubt
regarding precise meaning is present, a review court may properly
examine "the circumstances surrounding the enactment" of a stat-
ute, including "the evil which it is designed to remedy, . . . contem-
poraneous events, [and] the situation . . . as it was pressed upon the
attention of the legislative body."'79 A recent example proves the
point. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 80 the Supreme
Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-83 (1984); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
422 U.S. 694, 718-19 (1975).
76 See 35 Fed. Reg. 19,269 (1970) (notice of proposed rule making); 37 Fed. Reg.
20,677 (1972) (final rule codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1972)).
77 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(c) (1982).
78 United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 106 S. Ct. 555, 557 (1985). Despite this state-
ment, the Court in Rojas-Contreras went on to analyze the legislative history of the statute at
issue. Id. at 557-58. This supports the insight ofJudge Patricia M. Wald of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia that despite ritual invocation of the "plain meaning
rule, [n]o occasion for statutory construction now exists when the court will not look at the
legislative history." Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 321 (1983).
79 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 463 (1892). See also
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Statutory analy-
sis begins, of course, with the language of the statute. In virtually every case, however, it
does not end there but continues with a review of the legislative history."). Such analysis
can often lead to counter-intuitive conclusions. See, e.g., Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2827, 2832-34 (1984) (accepting "a slightly strained
reading of the word 'employer' " as one "more consistent with the [congressional pur-
pose]"); Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 321 (1984) (interpreting
statutory term "directly affecting" in a nonliteral manner, after a "detailed review" of its
legislative context).
80 106 S. Ct. 45 (1985). This decision was issued for a unanimous Court only a week
before Rojas-Contreras, 106 S. Ct. at 557, in which the "plain meaning rule" was recited.
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Court affirmed the Army Corps of Engineers' assertion of authority
to regulate "wetlands" under a statute granting it authority to regu-
late "navigable waters." The Court noted that "[o]n a purely lin-
guistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify 'lands,' wet or
otherwise, as 'waters.' "81 The Court, however, unanimously con-
cluded that when faced with the "problem of defining the bounds of
its regulatory authority, an agency may appropriately look to the leg-
islative history and underlying policies of its statutory grants of au-
thority." 82  Even though those sources did not "provide
unambiguous guidance for the Corps . they do support the rea-
sonableness of the Corps' approach." '83
Such reasoning is dispositive in the parallel importation debate.
The central question under section 526 is whether a foreign-affili-
ated domestic trademark owner is "a corporation. . . created or or-
ganized within the United States" and "domiciled in the United
States," within the meaning of section 526 as Congress intended it. The
Customs Service has had to determine "the bounds of its regulatory
authority" in light of these terms: do they admit to any limitation, or
does section 526 boundlessly protect foreign agencies against the in-
terests of domestic entrepreneurs? It is surely a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statutory language to read the statute's careful
limitation of protection to U.S.-based corporations as intending to
describe only independent domestic concerns.8 4
Fifty years of consistent enforcement, unaltered by Congress,
confirm this interpretation. Such a meaning would exclude goods
produced by subsidiaries, parents, or affiliated licensees of foreign
corporations, while still protecting domestic companies such as the
Bourjois Co., who stimulated the legislation. However, because the
"plain language" of section 526 does not address this important
question, the language alone cannot be dispositive.
Ultimately, opponents of parallel importation must argue that
because Congress did not explicitly distinguish domestic corpora-
tions that are independent entities from those technically domiciled
in the United States, but still controlled or heavily influenced by for-
eign parents, the Customs Service is absolutely barred from drawing
that distinction today. The Customs Service must treat domestic
81 106 S. Ct. at 462.
82 Id,
83 Id. The Court noted that "[a]n agency's construction of a statute it is charged with
enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed
intent of Congress." 106 S. Ct. at 461. See also cases cited supra note 76.
84 Indeed, the legislative history suggests that the "domiciled in the United States"
requirement of section 526, included in addition to the condition that the trademark be
"owned by a citizen of... the United States," was designed precisely to serve the pur-
pose of eliminating foreign agencies. See 62 CONG. REc. 11605 (1922) (foreign "agency"
not protected by section 526). See also supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
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agents of multinational manufacturers no differently than independ-
ent domestic companies.
The Supreme Court has already rejected a similar argument, al-
beit in a different context. The Court ruled in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp. ,85 that a corporate parent and subsidiary can-
not be deemed to have conspired with each other within the lan-
guage of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court based its decision
on the basic identity between a corporate parent and its subsidiary:
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of
interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general
corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate cor-
porate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple
team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver.
With or without a formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the
benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.
8 6
The Copperweld Court observed that the legal issue presented was not
"whether the term 'conspiracy' will bear a literal construction that
includes parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries. ' 87
Rather, "the appropriate inquiry requires us to explain the logic un-
derlying Congress' decision to exempt unilateral conduct from sec-
tion 1 scrutiny, and to assess whether that logic similarly excludes
the conduct of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary." 88
Likewise, the "appropriate inquiry" in parallel import cases is
not the literal application of section 526 to all corporations "created
or organized within" the United States and technically "domiciled"
in this country. The critical question is why did Congress exclude
foreign owners of U.S. trademarks and their agents from section 526,
if Congress wanted to protect only independent domestic entities.
The "logic underlying Congress' decision" is dispositive; thus, con-
gressional intent must be discerned.89 To permit captive affiliates or
subsidiaries of foreign corporations to invoke section 526 would
conflict with express congressional intent.
IV. Trademark Law
Section 42 of the Lanham Act is open to far less debate. That
statute provides that "no article of imported merchandise. . . which
shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter . . . shall be admitted to entry at any cus-
tom house of the United States." 9 0 Parallel imports, however, are by
definition genuine. Their marks cannot "copy or simulate" the
trademarks at issue because they are the bona fide marks applied by
85 104 S. Ct. 2742 (1984).
86 Id. at 2742.
87 Id. at 2745.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
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the bonafide owners, who have full right to do so. Because section 42
only applies to merchandise bearing counterfeit or unauthorized
trademarks that "copy or simulate" genuine marks, not the genuine
marks themselves, district courts have correctly dismissed parallel
import causes of action based on section 42. 9 1
The argument for a nonliteral application of section 42 begins
with the Katzel and A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge litigation. 92 When the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the American Bourjois Co., the
Court did so without the benefit of section 526. The plaintiff's claim
was based in part on section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,
which used the same "copy or simulate" language later enacted as
section 42 of the Lanham Act in 1946. Because the plaintiff won in
Katzel and Aldridge, opponents of parallel importation have argued
that the "copy or simulate" language must be applied to genuine
marks today. 93
This argument, however, lacks force beyond the fact that Aldridge
cited section 27 and the decision remains on the books. 94 The
Supreme Court, however, did not examine the legislative language
or intent of the trademark statute in either Katzel or Aldridge. The
decisions were exclusively equitable discourses 95 based on the pre-
cise facts at issue.
Moreover, a district court, which accepted this trademark theory
as a matter of law, noted that the theory is factually restricted to Kat-
zel-like cases where "the United States markholder has developed a
'separate, factually distinct, goodwill' in its product," and not "when
the United States markholder is related to the foreign markholder
and/or manufacturer."'96 Under this view, goods bearing authentic
91 Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 917; COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
92 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 675).
93 Two district courts have adopted some form of this argument. See IVeil Ceramics,
618 F. Supp. at 704-06; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 170-71.
94 See Weil Ceramics, 618 F. Supp. at 706 (approving the argument because "Katzel has
never been overruled and thus remains good law").
95 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
96 Wel Ceramics, 618 F. Supp. at 710 (quoting Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1174).
We would respectfully argue that in finding this standard fulfilled by Weil
Ceramics, the Weil Ceramics court may have misapplied its own criteria. In
brief, the court erred when, rather than determine as a factual, litigated mat-
ter whether Weil Ceramics had established a separate . . . goodwill, "factu-
ally distinct from the foreign manufacturer and trademark owner, the court
merelyfpresumed separate goodwill on the ground that it is the U.S. company
that stands behind the product and insures its quality in the United States."
Id. at 710.
The opinion reveals no evidence that U.S. consumers identified the source of the ce-
ramics as the United States, or that Weil was anything more than the "importer" and
distributor of the foreign goods. See id. at 713. Weil concededly was owned by a foreign
parent that also owned the foreign manufacturer, id. at 711, a fact that at least suggests
that Weil's policies and consequent goodwill were by no means "factually distinct" from
its affiliate's. The authors are informed that an appeal will be taken in Weil Ceramics if that
decision becomes a final judgment.
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trademarks can "copy or simulate" the registered marks of in-
dependent domestic companies only if they are not connected with
the domestic concern. By marking imported merchandise with a
trademark, a domestic registrant's foreign parent or affiliate authen-
ticates the merchandise as that of the domestic concern. Once
marked, the merchandise is original and can no longer "copy or
simulate."
This nonliteral theory based on a single case where the Court
made none of the usual inquiries into legislative meaning or intent is
erroneous. Nevertheless, if applied only in cases where Katzel inde-
pendence is proven, the nonliteral trademark theory should cause no
independent harm; the Customs regulations discussed above already
bar parallel importation in such cases. 97
The nonliteral trademark theory based on Katzel and Aldridge is,
however, anachronistic. Whatever Congress intended the words
"copy or simulate" to mean in 1905 or 1923, Congress plainly used
"copy or simulate" in 1946 with a specific, literal intent. Unlike
when the Supreme Court decided Katzel, Congress had before it sec-
tion 526 and the Customs regulations when it enacted section 42 of
the Lanham Act. The Customs regulations were expressly promul-
gated to enforce the "copy or simulate" language of section 27 as
well as section 526.98 Thus, when Congress incorporated the 'copy
or simulate' language into the 1946 law, they knew the long-standing
regulatory interpretation and the practice of the Customs Service,
which excluded enforcement against genuine marks. During hear-
ings held in 1944, the United States Tariff Commission specifically
pointed out this policy: "It is clear that Section 27 of the act of 1905
applies to all merchandise bearing infringing trade-marks. It does not
apply to the merchandise of the trade-mark owner since the registrant's goods
cannot 'copy or simulate' his own mark." 9 9
When Congress enacted section 42 using "copy or simulate," it
affirmed the administrative definition of those terms. Thus, the
choice was deliberate and literal: section 42 refers to counterfeit
marks and only section 526 applies to genuine goods.' 0 0
97 See supra text accompanying notes 35, 54.
98 The 1936 Treasury Decision 48,537, quoted supra text accompanying note 45,
stated that foreign-manufactured merchandise bearing genuine trademarks "shall not be
deemed . . to copy or simulate" the identical American-owned marks "if [the marks] are
owned by the same person . . . or corporation" (emphasis added). The cited authorities
for this decision were section 526 and Aldridge, a section 27 case. See also 8 Fed. Reg. 8296,
8300 (1943) (citing Sections 526 and 27 as joint authority for 19 C.F.R. § 11.14, the suc-
cessor regulation to the 1936 Treasury Decision and the predecessor to the current 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c)).
99 Trade-Marks: Hearings Before a Subcommoittee of the Senate Corn mittee on Patents on H.R.
82, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1944) (emphasis added).
100 See Vandenburgh, The Problem of Ioportation of Genuinelv Marked Goods is Not a Trade-
mark Problem, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707, 712 (1959). Thus, the Second Circuit has noted,
for example, that it would "appear anomalous . . . that irademark infringement action
226 [VOL. I I
PARALLEL IMPORTATION
V. International Standards and Antitrust Considerations
Reviewing courts should understand that the foreign commer-
cial community refuses to restrict parallel imports. Additionally, a
blanket ban on parallel importation allows anticompetitive interna-
tional price discrimination. The recent shift in domestic antitrust
policy, which favors vertical, territorial, and intrabrand price re-
straints, is, as a matter of economic theory, irrelevant to the regula-
tion of multinational manufacturers.
A. Our Trading Partners Permit Parallel Imports
Virtually every economically significant foreign jurisdiction per-
mits parallel importation. These jurisdictions recognize that con-
sumer prices are reduced by vigorous international price
competition. A ban on parallel imports would conflict with the poli-
cies of most of the free world, and would grant foreign companies a
degree of protection in the United States not enjoyed by domestic
manufacturers abroad.' 0 '
Most of the photographic equipment manufacturers who chal-
lenge the Customs Service's parallel importation regulations are
headquartered in Japan. In Japan, however, a trademark owner can-
not prevent the importation or sale of authentic trademarked prod-
ucts manufactured by a foreign affiliate. In a 1970 decision involving
"Parker" pens, the Osaka District Court ruled that the Japanese
trademark owner of "Parker" products could not bar others from
importing genuine "Parker" pens into Japan because parallel impor-
tation encourages free competition and improves prices and serv-
ices.10 2 Hence, Japanese-affiliated plaintiffs are attempting to obtain
in the United States whatJapan is unwilling to give U.S. manufactur-
ers there.
In 1972 the Japanese government issued a regulation under the
Customs Duties Act authorizing importation of genuine trademarked
goods if the domestic owner either holds the foreign trademark or
should be considered the same entity as the foreign trademark
owner.' 0 3 Moreover, the Fair Trade Commission of Japan issued
would lie" when the products sold are "in fact genuine and not spurious." DEP Corp. v.
Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 622 n.l (2d Cir. 1980). Accord Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc.
v. Daewoo Int'l (America) Corp., 207 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983); El Greco Leather
Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380, 1392-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
1 ( See generally Koritz, The Problem of Parallel Importation-A Comparative Study of Trade-
mark Law in the United States and Sweden, 9 J. INT'L LAW & POL. 389 (1977); Derenberg,
Termitorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 47 VA. L. REV. 733 (1961); Kitchin, The
Revlon Case: Trade Marks and Parallel Imports (U1K), EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., Mar. 1980, at
86.
102 See 16 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT'L L. 113, 131-132 (1972) (reporting in English the
Japanese Parker Pen cases).
1()3 Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57
WASH. L. REV. 433, 442-43 (1982).
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guidelines declaring the hindrance of parallel importation to be an
unfair business practice.' 0 4
Our European trading partners also permit parallel imports:
Switzerland,10 5 Austria, 10 6 the United Kingdom,' 0 7 West Ger-
many,' 08 the Netherlands, 10 9 and Sweden."10 A recent Canadian
case reaffirmed Canada's policy permitting parallel importation."'1
In addition, the European Court of Justice, which enforces the Euro-
pean Economic Community's Rome Treaty, has repeatedly held that
parallel importation is permissible unless the domestic and foreign
trademark owners are completely independent." 12
Finally, language in Principle D(4) of The Set of Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, indicates an international consensus that supports
parallel importation:
Enterprises should refrain from the following acts or behavior in a
relevant market when, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of
a dominant position or market power, they limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition...
(e) Restrictions on the importation of goods which have been legit-
imately marked abroad with a trademark identical with or similar to
the trademark protected as to identical or similar goods in the im-
porting country where the trademarks in question are of the same
origin, i.e. belong to the same owner or are used by enterprises be-
tween which there is economic, organizational, managerial or legal
interdependence and where the purpose of such restrictions is to
maintain artificially high prices.'13
B. Antitrust Considerations
Attacks on parallel importation attempt to enforce a blatantly
anticompetitive international system. Multinational enterprises
should not be permitted to engage in vertical territorial allocations
or price discrimination among different countries. While the prac-
tices are not per se unlawful, under domestic antitrust laws a manufac-
turer or distributor may not establish exclusive selling territories for
authorized retail dealers unless the distributor shows some con-
104 Id. at 43.
1o5 See Takamatsu, supra note 103 at 444.
1o See id. at 446.
107 See id. at 447.
108 See id. at 445.
109 See id. at 446-47.
1I1 See Koritz, supra note 101 at 406.
I Consumers Distributing Co., Ltd. v. Seiko Time Canada, Ltd., 1984 S.C.R. 583.
112 See Kemp, The Erosion of Trademark Rights in Europe: Phase II, 69 TRADE-MARK REP.
460 (1979).
113. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development at 10-11 (footnote omitted), U.N.
Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev. 1 (1980).
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sumer benefit which justifies such a restraint."14 Moreover, a domes-
tic manufacturer of trademarked goods who seeks to establish a
higher price in a specific part of the country may not institute trade-
mark infringement actions to prevent arbitrage among the different
domestic markets. 1 5 Lawsuits against parallel importers are just
such a tactic.
Where multinational corporations are involved, improving in-
terbrand competition cannot be reasonably presumed. First, the dis-
crepancy between the prices charged by parallel import retailers and
those of "authorized" distributors indicates that artificially high
prices currently exist and would continue to exist. Moreover, for-
eign corporations can escape U.S. antitrust enforcement simply by
concluding their anticompetitive arrangements beyond U.S. territo-
rial limits. Accordingly, reduced intrabrand competition will not
necessarily produce increased interbrand competition. Collusion is
just as likely. Simply because United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. 116
is no longer good law does not mean that international vertical terri-
torial restraints are lawful-let alone laudable-in every instance.
In a 1971 letter to the Commissioner of Customs, which was
part of the administrative record of the 1972 promulgation of 19
C.F.R. § 133.21, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
explained that a broad construction of section 526 should be re-
jected on antitrust grounds:
[A]n American component of a multinational enterprise could insu-
late itself from competition from third parties who had purchased
the identical article from the foreign affiliate of the American firm.
Such a rule would not protect the consumer from deception, since
the goods would be of identical quality. Its only effect would be to
raise prices by eliminating competition.' '
7
114 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52, 55-57 (1977);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068, 1075-81 (2d Cir. 1980); Muenster
Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981).
115 See, e.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823, 825-26
(E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 25 F.2d 641, 648-49 (3d Cir. 1958); see also United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944).
116 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
117 Letter from Walker B. Comegys to the Honorable Myles J. Ambrose (April 19,
1971) (discussing possible construction of Section 526 of the rariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526). There is only one antitrust decision directly on point. In Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at
77, the court found that efforts to exclude competing parallel imports constituted an anti-
trust violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). That judgment
was later vacated at the suggestion of the Solicitor General. Guerlain, 358 U.S. at 915. The
district court's discussion of the issues of statutory construction and antitrust law was not
repudiated, however. The Solicitor General's pleading stated only that Customs officials
had "deemed themselves legally constrained to grant the claim of statutory protection
invoked by the appellants." Aotion to Vacate Judgments, O.T. 1958, Nos. 24, 30, 31, 15, p.
7a. As John Atwood later explained, because the Customs Bureau's "[r]egulations were
not set up to specifically elicit [the] kind of information" necessary to identify controlling
foreign affiliations, Guerlain "left the Bureau of Customs in an awkward position."
Atwood, supra note 49, at 307. It was not thought fair to proceed with the Guerlain anti-
trust action when there had been governmental participation, knowing or otherwise, in the
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That reasoning was correct in 1971 and is correct today, regardless
of current domestic enforcement policies.'
t18
VI. Conclusion
Opponents of parallel importation act out of commercial self-
interest and have been rebuffed by the White House and Congress.
The legal attack on parallel importation is based on a simplistic
"plain meaning" statutory argument that fails upon careful exegesis.
So long as this country remains committed to principles of free
trade, parallel importation will continue to provide a low-cost option
for the domestic consumer.
allegedly unlawful conduct. See also Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566, 1567 (Customs allowed im-
portation "before disclosure of affiliates was required" and because it lacked informa-
tion"). The Solicitor General, however, continued to express the government's view "that
trademark protection is not available to prohibit the importation of a product legitimately
marked by an affiliate of the trademark owner." Motion to Vacate Judgements, supra, at 7-8.
The Guerlain episode merely disclosed a weakness in existing regulations that was subse-
quently cured.
118 If anything further need be said regarding the position of the Department ofJus-
tice, it is only that most recently the Solicitor General has filed a Brief in Opposition to
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court in Vivitar, 106 S. Ct. 791, affirming the Department's
endorsement of "Customs' reading of 19 U.S.C. § 1526 and ...the agency's longstand-
ing interpretation of that statute." Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Viv-
itar Corp. v. United States, No. 85-411 (1985).
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